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I
The results of the 1952 elections focus attention on the perennial
question of how to get outstanding commissioners on state and na-
tional independent regulatory agencies. The question goes to the
very core of legislative-executive relationships, and challenges both
the separation of powers and checks and balances. One Senator thinks
the solution is to abolish human nature; but one Administrator is
more hopeful: "everything will be wonderful when the millennium
comes, but, of course, we will all be dead then." Although no panacea
is immediately forthcoming, analysis, diagnosis, and discussion will
encourage the public to apply proper sanctions through the ballot
box.
Laws governing -the place of the independent regulatory com-
missions at both levels in legislative-executive relationships and in
the administrative hierarchy have received much attention, but rela-
tively little has been written about the men who govern within these
segments of the economy and the circumstances under which they were
selected. The recent judicial self-restraint in refraining from substitut-
ing judicial for commission conclusions and of giving greater weight
to the independence of regulatory agencies' emphasizes the importance
of high calibre commission personnel. Because the men who govern
are fully as important as the laws they execute, Wigmore pleaded that
we put our trust in men and minds rather than rules.2 Commissioner
Eastman put it this way: "The statute which the tribunal administers
should be well, simply, and carefully framed, but the personnel which
does the administering is more important than the wording of the
Visiting Scholar at Columbia University.
I Federal Power Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, 315 U. S.
575 (1942); Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 820 U. S. 591 (1944).
"When Congress ... fails to provide a formula for the Commission to follow, courts
are not warranted in rejecting the one which the Commission employs unless it
plainly contravenes the statutory scheme of regulation." Colorado Interstate Gas Co.
v. Federal Power Commission, 324 U. S. 581,589 (1945).
2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 4 b (3rd ed. 1940).
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statute. Good men can produce better results with a poor law than poor
men can produce with a good law." 3
The new administration will have to nominate several commis-
sioners as terms of incumbents expire; a Republican controlled Senate
must confirm nominations. Each branch will register its imprint on
regulatory commissions. Organic statutes provide some continuity and
thus a time lag before wholesale change is possible; unless Congress
should, by law, create new commissions or enlarge the number of
commissioners. What qualities should an executive seek in nominating
commissioners? When should the Senate hold a hearing before con-
firmation? What type of questions should be asked? How well is the
Senate equipped to ascertain if a nominee warrants confirmation?
What do recent case studies show? The problem is more than legal;
the training and fitness of potential commissioners must be considered,
in contrast with their political antecedents and support. This involves
ethical and moral standards to which political leaders should adhere
in nominating and confirming top administrators.
In some states political activity and/or a nod from powerful cor-
porations unfortunately is the controlling factor in determining
agency personnel. Thus, the quasi-judicial function of those regulatory
commissions has degenerated into a simulation based on political ex-
pediency and pressure group activity. Sometimes state constitutional
provisions and other reasons beyond the control of the appointing
authorities are in part responsible. This study excludes those juris-
dictions; its relevance there is intended to be didactic rather than
descriptive.
When the chief executive's political party controls the Senate,
particularly in the early or honeymoon period of a session, confirma-
tion hearings may not be rigid. Executives have tried to reduce sena-
torial confirmation to a mere routine by appealing to party respon-
sibility, patronage, and executive responsibility. When each branch
is cortrolled by a different party, the Senate can embarrass the admin-
istration by rejecting its nominees, and the executive may try to
impose his cohorts on the Senate. Even when the same party controls
both branches, however, conflict arises, particularly after an emergency
when the legislature has yielded to temporary executive domination
and is struggling to regain its old prerogatives.
Executive attempts to override the independence of commissions
was climaxed by President Coolidge's request for the undated resigna-
tion of a member of the Tariff Commission as a condition to his reap-
pointment, by his further attempt to hold one of his appointees to the
Shipping Board to a prenomination agreement, and Franklin D.
3 All quotations of Mr. Eastman are from his speech at a testimonial dinner on




Roosevelt's unsuccessful attempt to remove William E. Humphrey
from the Federal Trade Commission.4 But Roosevelt was more success-
ful later, when a series of strategic appointments tended to subordinate
several commissions to the executive.
On the other hand, the Senate tried to oust Dr. George Otis Smith
and two colleagues from the Federal Power Commission.5 Dr. Smith,
a supporter of private operation of power sites, carried two colleagues
in the dismissal of two FPC aides known as foes of the power trust.
Democrats and progressive Republicans spearheaded the attempt to
remove the Commissioners even though they had been confirmed and
taken the oaths of office. The Supreme Court rejected the attempted
recalls. A few years later Congress passed the Federal Power Act of
1935. Some Senators would solve the problem by unconstitutionally
eliminating the President from the appointment process, 6 thereby
removing the agencies from any degree of executive responsibility.
The assumption is made here that the structure of the independent
regulatory commissions, a distinctly American and one of the few
political inventions of the last century, will remain basically unaltered
-that the agencies are arms of Congress and that the appointment of
commissioners is a joint legislative-executive function.7 But once an
appointment is made, do the commissioners in the United States, where
legislation and administration are theoretically separated, feel that they
4 Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602 (1935).
5 United States v. George Otis Smith, 286 U. S. 6 (1932).
6 Prof. Pritchett has written that one Senator would like to take the appointive
power away from the President and vest it in the Speaker of the House, subject to
senatorial confirmation, even though this would require constitutional amendment.
The American Political Science Review, Oct. 1949. Some members of the Hoover Com-
mission were unable to agree whether the commissions are responsive to Congress, or
part of the executive establishment. See also, Report of the President's Committee on
Administrative Management.
7 The position of the independent regulatory commissions was stated in Hum-
phrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602, 625-626, 628 (1935); Congress
established the FTC as "a body which shall be independent of executive authority,
except in its selection, and free to exercise its judgment without leave or hindrance
of any other official or any department of the government.... The Federal Trade
Commission is an administrative body created by Congress to carry into effect
legislative policies embodied in the statute in accordance with the legislative standard
therein prescribed, and to perform other specified duties as a legislative or as a
judicial aid. Such a body cannot in any proper sense be characterized as an arm or
an eve of the executive. Its duties are performed without executive leave and in
the contemplation of the statute, must be free from executive control." In Ohio, by
contrast, the Commission's duties are not legislative or judicial, but executive.
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company v. Railroad Commission of Ohio, 10 Ohio N. P.
(N. S.) 665, 669 (1910); 21 Ohio Dec. 468, 472. In California the Governor is the
sole appointing authority, and the commission's annual report is submitted to him.
8 "Domestic Control of Atomic Energy, An Experiment in Government." Bruns-
wick, Main, July 22,1949.
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have two masters, the legislators who made the law and the chief
executive who is politically elected and who is also their boss? Or is a
dyarchy discernible where political and administrative functions
require complementary bosses?
As this legislative-executive duel continues, the independent
commissions are vulnerable to capture and control by their clientele.
After the regulatory statute is passed, public enthusiasm often wanes
until hardly anybody but those regulated pay much attention to the
commission. As acting chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission,
Sumner T. Pike keenly summarized the frequent cycles of a com-
mission's vitality:
1. A burst of interest and enthusiasm prior to and at the time
of the passage of the basic act.
2. In the atmosphere of that enthusiasm the selection of a
competent Commission plus staffing of personnel of a high
grade which could only be attracted by a new and stimulating
enterprise.
3. Considerable accomplishment under high head steam for
the first few years.
4. Gradual incurrence of opposition and loss of enthusiasm
with a tendency to routinize operations.
5. A certain amount of wing clipping by the Appropriations
and other committees.
6. Appearance of political patronage in both appointments
to the Commission and in filling positions on the staff.
7. Finally, we have "just another government agency."
It has frequently been said that ten years is as long as one
can expect such an agency to be efficient. Sometimes this
period has been extended and in other cases it has been very
much shortened. This process is perhaps almost inevitable;
and it may not be entirely bad in many cases since the main
battle should be won and sound precedents should be estab-
lished within the first few years.
II
Presidents and governors nominate to give administrative di-
rection to the agencies; it is no accident when a McReynolds or
Frankfurter is selected. To the extent that the chief executive is a
political leader, he will nominate men whose backgrounds are sym-
pathetic to (the particular law, and whose discretionary authority
under it will likely lean toward the executive's policies. Professor
Cushman pointed to the undesirability of manning these agencies with
decayed politicians who have political claims on the President, but
observed that political appointees are not ipso facto and inevitably
bad; many officers chosen for bad or irrelevant reasons have proved
[Vol. 13
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competent and high-minded. 9 The Hoover Commission said the
President does not recognize the importance of regulatory positions.
Organization reforms in 1950 gave the President greater control over
several commissions; he designates the chairmen, who serve at his will
for indefinite periods and whose powers were enlarged. President
Truman took advantage of this power to promote Thomas C. Buchanan
and former New York Senator James M. Mead to the chairmanship of
the FPC and FTC, respectively. Buchanan's elevation was construed as
a maneuver to further the administration's public power and natural
gas programs.
At the outset, a distinction must be made between regulatory
and promotional agencies. The former is an administrative function;
the latter an executive function. Political values, together with a
willingness to accept executive domination and to follow lines of
political policy, are relevant for Cabinet and operating-agency ap-
pointments. Economic values, together with an independence from
political pressures, should be the main consideration in selecting
personnel for an independent agency. 10
No iron-clad formula is available on the requirements an execu-
tive should seek in nominating "good" commissioners, though statutes
establish some limitations. In Ohio, where the Governor has wide
latitude legally in nominating commissioners, eligibility requires state
residence; and precludes holding any other public office of trust or
profit, and any occupation or business inconsistent with a commis-
sioner's duties. The commission is bipartisan. Confirmation is by the
Senate, but the Governor designates the chairman.
Although the Hoover Commission recommended its extension,
the bipartisan requirement of most regulatory agencies is a pious wish
to insure divergence of political views. Because Americans have in-
sisted upon geographical representation since prerevolutionary days
and men are products of their ecology and environment, men of af-
fairs are often Republicans or Democrats because they were born in
a particular state. Thus, appointing authorities can find men from
either party whose views are acceptable. A conservative Democrat and
liberal Republican probably have more in common than a right and
9 Robert E. Cushman, The Independent Regulatory Commissions (New York,
1941), p. 752.
10 Although the Hoover Commission classified the AEC as an independent but
operating agency it is also included here in the regulatory periphery because of recent
trends. Much regulation is in the framework of the statute even though the industry
the Commission is regulating has not yet gone far. Whereas most commissions regulate
abuses already existing and buck vested interests, the AEC is establishing the rules
as this industry develops. In June of 1950 the Commission signed regulatory contracts
with four private groups for experimental investigations in the use of atomic energy
for power. Lincoln Smith, "Regionalism in Regulatory Administration" in Public
Utilities Fortnightly, March 26, 1953.
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left winger within either major party; a liberal Republican may be
more like a liberal Democrat than a conservative Democrat or Repub-
lican.
Another limitation placed on executives, sometimes by statute
and sometimes by political expediency, is spatial distribution of ap-
pointments. Geographical representation in elections affects the
administrative process. This is partly because our political parties are
amalgamations of local party hierarchies, and the choice of commis-
sioners is part of the political process. Though defensible for Cabinet
and some other posts, ambassadors from their own sections should not
serve in quasi-judicial capacities.
Some statutes set minimum qualifications in training and ex-
perience, but seldom stipulate whether the administrator shall be a
"generalist" or specialist. This issue is not clear-cut, because some spe-
cialists began as "generalists." For states supplying meager budgets,
much can be said for specialists. But Professor Fesler concluded that
character becomes more important as commissions have built up able
staffs of experts to advise them on technical questions.11 On this point
Eastman said:
It is not necessary for the members of -the tribunal to be
technical experts on the subject matter of their administration.
As a matter of fact, you could not find a man who is a techni-
cal expert on any large part of the matters upon which the
Interstate Commerce Commission finds it necessary to pass.
The important qualifications are ability to grasp and com-
prehend facts quickly, and to consider them in their relation
to the law logically and with an open mind.
Yet the specialist with broad perspective can be an efficient
top administrator. Commissioners frequently specialize; they divide
their 3york and each writes opinions on particular segments, subject
-to the concurrence of the commission. The Interstate Commerce
Commission is a pat example, with its divisional organization and
with individual commissioners supervising the work of particular
bureaus. Two grave dangers of this compartmental specialization ap-
pear. Concerted action is difficult; one man policy may be substituted
for board decisions. Also, personal attachments and loyalties are likely
to develop in both directions between commissioners and staff.
Statutes often provide that no commissioner may engage in any
other business, vocation, or employment. The question then arises
how to get specialists, particularly in economic matters, in the public
service who do not have business entanglements.' 2 Or, how can a
11 James W. Fesler, The Independence of State Regulatory Agencies (Chicago,
1942), p. 9n.
12 Ethical Standards in Government. Report of a subcommittee of the Committee
on Labor and Public Welfare, U. S. Senate (Washington, 1951), pp. 20-21.
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successful expert, once he is inducted into the public service probably
at a salary sacrifice, cast aside past experience and prejudice, and
resolve conflicting interests impartially? Would the umpire favor
his old teammates? Much depends upon the character, temperament,
and sense of justice of the man. Like many judges who refuse to par-
ticipate in a particular decision because of past personal or professional
connection with it, the reason is not so much that they would favor
their former associates as that in leaning backward to be fair to the
other side, injustice may be done to their former colleagues.
Although professional and academic backgrounds may cause
commissioners to be hypercautious, such experience has distinct ad-
vantages. Furthermore, an apprenticeship and successful administrative
experience in state government are valuable assets in recruiting ap-
pointees on the national level. The records of Commissioners Richard
B. McEntire and Nelson Lee Smith are examples of these postulates.
This suggests a career service in regulatory administration. But then
the few states with outstanding personnel would obtain a large pro-
portion of commissioners' posts.
Personal and professional sympathy for the job is a prerequisite.
This includes faithful adherence to the law and also to its adminis-
tration in the spirit with which it was enacted. By dragging his feet,
losing his papers, or merely inertia, a commissioner may emasculate
the objectives of the statute.
Capacity for hard13 and sometimes thankless work, conscientious
effort to make a good record, patience, courtesy, moral courage, lack
of prejudice, and a desire to be helpful to the extent the law permits
are personal characteristics which are helpful if not essential. The
stereotype that Englishmen are men of action, Frenchmen, men of
thought, and Spaniards, men of passion, 14 suggest other valuable
qualities; a highly desirable combination would be an administrator
who, in the words of a French philosopher, thinks like a man of
action and acts like a man of thought. Furthermore, a commissioner
should be familiar with Jeffersonian democracy and prefer to work
not so much for as with the public; to help rather -than make the public
obey the law.
Equally important, commissioners must not only be personally
acceptable, they must possess winning personalities and be specialists
in human relationships .to get along well with brass hats and prima
donnas who happen to have power or influence. Administrators in
the top brackets are still human beings with their personal likes and
prejudices; likewise they are independent of, and yet responsible to,
13 A story is told that in one state two prominent politicians manipulated them-
selves into commissioners' posts. There they really did experience hard work, and
shortly they pulled strings and got judgeships where they relaxed and enjoyed life.
14 Salvador de Madariaga, Englishmen, Frenchmen, Spaniards (London, 1937).
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other human beings who are products of particular environments and
who have their own idiosyncrasies.
Ability to work with others as a team is a basic requirement-the
facility and experience of working in groups or as cogs in an organi-
zation. Highly developed individualists who tend to be intolerant of
any intellectual differences, who are prone to personalize, and there-
fore not well suited to the development of a smoothly functioning or-
ganization seldom fit into an agency which needs to operate on an
even keel regardless of the particular individuals composing it or
its staff at a given time.
Needs also vary with the particular agency. A desirable man for
the quasi-judicial Interstate Commerce Commission or the Public
Service Commission of New York might well be ideologically or
temperamentally unsuited for membership on a primarily operating
agency such as the Civil Aeronautics Board. Some administrators in
operations and -those regulating trade with enemies and working
under public health and quarantine laws must sometimes act first
and explain afterward.
An open and analytical mind, and judicious temperament as
distinguished from a "legal mind," are fundamental prerequisites in
regulatory administration. Though commissioners have their own
philosophies and prejudices, their decisions should not conform to
personal whims and preconceived notions. Regulation in the public
interest implies that investors, consumers, management, and the public-
at-large have both rights and obligations toward each other. Governor
Hugh Gregg of New Hampshire plans -to select qualified men capable
of "honest, intelligent, and just decisions." He declared: "The general
public, ,the investor and the utility all have a right to expect that ap-
pointments to the Public Utilities Commission will be free from
political prejudice." The governing statutes assume an identity of
interests up 'to a certain point; beyond that, conflicts must be re-
solved within the discretionary authority of the regulatory agencies.
The ideal commissioner will be sensitive to the conflicting forces
within the public interest, and strive for a common denominator which
15 Federal Power Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, 315 U. S.
575, 606-608 (1942) ; Covington & Lexington Turnpike Co. v. Sandford, 164 U. S. 578,
596 (1896); Dayton-Goose Creek Railway Co. v. United States, 263 U. S. 456 (1924).
Eastman said: "One of the great dangers in public regulation by administrative
tribunals of business concerns is the resulting division of responsibility, as between
the managements and the regulators, for the successful functioning of these concerns.
For example, there was a tendency ... on the part of those financially interested in
the railroads to think of the financial success of those properties solely in terms of
rates and wages and the treatment of rates and wages by public authorities. Sight was
lost of the essentiality of constant, unremitting enterprise an4 initiative in manage-
ment. The importance of sound public regulation cannot be minimized, but it must
not be magnified to the exclusion of those factors in financial success upon which
ordinary private business must rely."
[Vol. 13
APPOINTMENTS OF COMMISSIONERS
sees each in relation to the others.15 The regulatory process needs com-
missioners who can function as a court of arbitration within the area
of discretion delegated to them as a court of law.
Thus a commissioner's philosophy and temperament give a sense
of direction to the agency's work. The same law would take on quite
a different complexion, for example, if administered by five young,
vigorous, and conservative commissioners than if administered by a
commission of sedate and progressive, or even scrupulous but unimag-
inative and unpredictable men. 10 On the negative side, there is no
place on regulatory commissions for martyrs for lost causes; otherwise
we would have an irresponsible bureaucracy. Commissioner Eastman
succinctly remarked: "Zealots, evangelists, and crusaders have their
value before an administrative tribunal but not on it."
III
Professor Herring concluded in 1936 that the Senate did not
usually question presidential appointments to regulatory commis-
sions. 17 Subsequently, however, in the capacity of checking bureaucracy
and the "headless fourth branch" of government, the trend was altered.
In "isolated instances that gathered with cumulative force," the Senate
pushed and sometimes succeeded in its demands for more general
scrutiny of administrative appointments.' 8 But it failed in 1943 to
extend senatorial confirmation to all appointments in excess of
$4,500 a year when the House rejected the McKellar Bill.
The degree to which the Senate is equipped to supervise adminis-
trative work of the commissions indicates the degree to which it is
justified in passing judgment on confirmations. Standing committees
exercise some control, although Professor Cushman observed that com-
mittees usually provided little more than casual hit-or-miss supervi-
sion.19 Under the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 standing
committees are responsible for legislative oversight of administrative
agencies. Thus the legislative branch moves toward quasi-judicial
functions. However, legislators with their dual responsibilities of
getting elected and making laws, usually lack the time and ability to
16 "Policy decisions are made by men, and men inevitably, if not consciously,
filter program objectives through their own values, their own aggressions, their own
struggles for status and prestige. Personal desires, interpersonal animosities, the
self-conception of one's role and its importance, the expectations of others-all these
factors affect an organization's objectives and the process of decision. This is as true
for government as it is for other institutions." Morton Grodzins, Americans Betrayed
(Chicago, 1949), p. VIII.
17 E. Pendleton Herring. Federal Commissioners (Cambridge, 1936), p. 73.
18 Arthur W. Macmabon, "Senatorial Confirmation" in Public Administration
Review, Autumn, 1943, p. 285.
19 Cushman, op. cit., p. 6 7 2.
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thoroughly investigate an agency. Confirmation is generally delegated
to Senate committees; otherwise the approval of commissioners who
are not acceptable to a majority of the supervising legislative committee
would result in an untenable position for either or both. Committee
probing is not always incisive enough to get at fundamentals. Hearings
often are political, substituting willful for reasonable consideration. 20
When Congressman Charles A. Wolverton was chairman of the
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce in the 80th Congress,
he inaugurated a technique which, though subsequently abandoned,
provides an opportunity for more intelligent hearings if adopted by
the Senate in the future. The heads of each agency under the supervision
of the committee were invited to appear before it informally early in
the session for brief statements and questions and answers. This plan
served several very useful purposes. It permitted committee members,
particularly new ones, and the commissioners to get acquainted; it
enabled the agencies to explain the nature of their duties, their under-
standing of congressional intent, and to emphasize problems which
seemed to require congressional attention; and it enabled committee
members to ask questions about administering the basic statutes and to
discuss troubling matters.23
Congress tightened controls over several experimental and highly
controversial areas by establishing joint or watchdog committees. If
successful, their extension may be expected. These committees are
generally subcommittees of the regular committees, often with a
resolution giving direction for investigations and providing additional
funds for staff work. The Senate section of the committee, which is
responsible for recommending the confirmation of commissioners, has
a unique opportunity to appraise the record of incumbents.
The trend is to strengthen legislative rather than executive con-
trol of commissions through watchdog committees. Carroll L. Wilson,
general manager of the Atomic Energy Commission, charged that the
Commission was drifting toward policy of management by the
watchdog committee, and that Commission chairman Gordon Dean
was too subservient to his old law partner, chairman Brien McMahon
of the committee. But commissioners complained that Wilson actually
ran the show, pushing the Commission into an advisory role. The
general manager, then a semi-independent official appointed by the
President, was placed in the administrative hierarchy under the five
commissioners by subsequent legislation.
20 See, for example, Lindsay Rogers, "Congressional Investigations: The Prob-
lem and Its Solution" in The University of Chicago Law Review, Spring, 1951, pp.
464-477.
21 These hearings were held in executive session, and records were not printed.
Congressman Wolverton's opinion is that the agencies welcomed the opportunity to




Under the Legislative Reorganization Act, Senator Edwin C.
Johnson claimed committees have the duty "to interrogate nominees
for commissioners of the agencies coming under our jurisdiction with
respect to the policies they espouse; and I believe it particularly im-
portant in the case of reappointments that such commissioners render,
in effect, an accounting of their stewardships to the people of the United
States through us." 22 The committee was interested in the record of
the commissioner, and "what we may expect of you in the future with
respect to policies of and questions pending before your Commission."
The committee justified its pointed questions in the public interest.
Senator Taft of Ohio maintains that the Senate should pass on
character, ability, education, training, and competence of nominees;
and that a man need not be a criminal or guilty of some sensational
default to warrant rejection. "There is perhaps a slight presumption
in favor of the President's nominations, but nothing that relieves us
from making a complete examination ourselves." 23 In the case of
Cabinet officers, he said, the presumption in favor of the nominee is
stronger, but that is all. According to Senator Harry F. Byrd, the duty
of confirmation is not merely perfunctory. The President should have
wide latitude in his appointees, and Byrd frequently has voted to
confirm officials whom he would not have appointed had the respons-
ibility been his. "The confirmation authority of the Senate is one
of the checks and balances of our democracy, and should be exercised
by members of the Senate temperately and courageously."2 4 Senator
Johnson (Texas) maintains that the matter of "advice and consent"
should not become a mere formality of "accept and agree." 25
Appointment is primarily an executive function and respons-
ibility; the Senate's function is that of a safety valve. Even though
character may fluctuate, our history is not without examples of ap-
pointees who have hoodwinked both President and Senate. If the
Senate takes greater control over appointments, it should assume
greater responsibility through committees. After the minimum quali-
fications, the crux of the problem is the extent to which the Senate
is entitled to reassure itself on the nominee's economic views and back-
ground.
Because confirmation is an administrative process, considerable
22 Nomination of George E. Sterling to the FCC. Hearings before the Com-
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, U. S. Senate, 81st Congress, 2d session,
June 15,16,1950. p. 1.
23 Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 2d session, Vol. 92, Part 1, Feb. 18, 1946,
p. 1395.
24 Ibid., 81st Congress, Vol. 95, Part 5, pp. 6406-6407.
25 Ibid., Vol. 95, Part 11, Oct. 12, 1949, p. 14379. Professor Lindsay Rogers con-
cluded that the Senate should interfere if it believes that a nominee is unfit; "a
reasonable presidential discretion should not be presidential license." The American
Senate (New York, 1926), pp. 30-31.
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latitude in procedure is required. Even if a rigid rule could be es-
tablished, reasonable men might well differ in its application. Instead
of trying to set specific limits on the kind of questions asked, an adher-
ence to a sense of decency, fair play, and equity are far more desirable.
In a penetrating treatise on congressional oversight of admin-
trative agencies, a committee of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York concluded -that "while the legislature has a continu-
ous obligation to study and assess the operations of an agency, the
legislature's essential duty is to establish an act and the agency's
essential duty is 'to administer the act.26 ... The problem is a delicate
one and is not susceptible of rigid control or rule-making. In the last
analysis, only a disciplined attitude of discernment and self-restraint
can yield assurance that the legislator and administrator will each ex-
ecute his own proper function and scrupuously respect the other's."
With limited exceptions "legislative oversight of an agency should be
essentially directed to -the need for altering standards, structure and
procedure, or budget ,through legislation." Congress or the committee
should not interfere with pending or decided cases, but the committee
should have greater latitude in matters pertaining to the agency's
procedure and substantive rules. But even in these respects, "Congress
having delegated to the agency the power to regulate, the agency must,
in the last analysis, have a free hand to exercise its own informed
judgment." Congress, then, if dissatisfied, should amend the statute, not
coerce the agency to change its view.
In the confirmation of any appointment, however, the New York
committee thinks the Senate may legitimately feel that the nominee's
record indicates a disposition to depart from the legislative policy in
ways for which amending legislation provides no satisfactory redress.
Experience may show the nominee to be so confirmed in his habits of
thought that amendments do not prevent him from consistently
whittling away at or expanding upon the legislative policy whenever
a plausible occasion arises. Such circumstances warrant senatorial
inquiry.
Commissioners must distinguish between matters of general policy
and matters of administrative discretion. The legislative body adopts
basic policies such as "fair value", "just compensation for services
rendered" and other fundamental tenets of policy for its territorial
jurisdiction. As an agent of Congress or the state legislature, commis-
sioners can determine policy only within the frame of reference
assigned to them by .the basic statutes; they cannot supplant or modify
the statute by administrative interpretation. In 1910 the Supreme Court
remarked that the powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission
26 The Record of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. Vol. 5,
No. 1, Jan., 1950, pp. 13-14, 19. See also, Beryl Harold Levy, American Bar Association
Journal, Vol. 36, May, 1950, pp. 236ff.
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were "expected to be exercised in the coldest neutrality. '2 7 The Court
of Appeals has emphasized that the regulatory agencies have the duty
of administering the law as they find it, and of recommending to
Congress amendments which their experience demonstrates may be
necessary or desirable, rather than recasting it through strained or
tortured interpretation. 28 In this way the commission, as a planning
agency, can make intrinsic and extrinsic contributions to general policy,
but Congress is free to accept, reject or alter the recommendations.
Before confirming an economist in, for example, the Federal
Power Commission, this writer suggests -these questions: Is an economist
needed for this post? Is he a reputable economist? Does he have a
judicious mind? Is he aware that administration of the power and
natural gas acts will require him to help resolve many complex na-
tional-state conflicts? Is he open minded on questions of public and
private power? On control of independent gas producers?29 For reap-
pointment: Does his record on the Commission warrant reappoint-
ment? By his record, has he helped to accomplish the purposes of the
statute? Actually, though, if a Senator does not like the commissioner
or does not like some of his decisions, emotion and prejudice may be
the conditioning factors. But the rationalization for rejection would
27 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago, Rock Island 9- Pacific Ry., 218
U.s. 88,102 (1910).
28 Border Pipe Line Company v. Federal Power Commission, 171 F. 2d 149,
152-153 (1948). In a similar vein the Court has compelled the Commission to adhere
to the restrictive language in the organic act. Idaho Power Company v. Federal Power
Commission 189 F. 2d 665 (1951). And more recently: While the court must not be
deprived of the "informed judgment of the Commission", it must scrutinize com-
mission orders to determine whether the commission has "patently traveled outside
the orbit of its authority." Federal Power Commission v. Arizona Edison Co,, Inc.,
194 F. 2d 679, 685 (1952). And on the state level: "Commissioners are not a law unto
themselves, and they have no right to take short cuts across the rights of others-even
of those engaged in a public service-to reach popular results." New England Tele-
phone & Telegraph Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine, Jan. 27, 1953.
29 Professor Herring observed that the ability and integrity of men have been
questioned chiefly when administrative policies and economic theories of particular
appointees have strongly diverged from those of their critics. Herring, op. cit., p. 6.
He concluded: "Senators place more emphasis upon certain attitudes and loyalties
than they do upon the capacity or training of the appointee", and stated the nature
of the questions as follows: "Will the appointee carry out the policy of Congress or
will he attempt to develop a line of commission policy? Will he incline toward
Presidential or toward Congressional leadership? Is he a friend of the little man or is
he a supporter of big business? Is he more sympathetic toward the rich man or the
poor man? Is he tied in with the Washington bureaucracy or is he taken fresh from
private life. With what economic interests can he be identified? What is there in his
background that suggests a connection with the 'power trust' or the 'sugar interests'
or Wall Street? Senators are interested in two general points of reference: the ap-
pointee's financial connections and his political relations. Out of this they apparently
hope to get his economic and social philosophy." Ibid., p. 7.
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be on a professional basis-the nominee is incompetent, disloyal, or
defeated the legislative intent of the law.
It would be unethical to pry into the attitude of -the prospective
appointee toward details of regulatory policy. The candidate probably
does not have in mind the information essential to formulate an ad-
equate and candid answer on specific situations he may have to meet,
and upon which he should not decide until he has all the facts and an
opportunity for study and reflection. Furthermore, such questions
would almost certainly call for commitments, implied if not explicit,
which would restrict the commissioner's freedom of action and in-
dependence of judgment.
Hearings would be superfluous when the nominees are well known
by large sectors of the Senate. This includes a man of national stature,
one with an outstanding public record on the state or national level,
and one held in high esteem through former membership in the Senate.
The Senate is entitled to delve more deeply into the views of the
nominee if the electorate has repudiated the President's political
party in offyear elections. This is because regulation is a politically
sensitive process; appointments should reflect the political party in
power.
IV
Several confirmation cases point up the legislative-executive con-
flict. Some show how the Senate has tried to fortify the commissions
as arms of Congress and to control commissioners; some have been on
genuine matters of policy; some on politics; some on personalities;
others defy classification. Many show unprofessional and irrational
factors which sometimes controlled.
Senators have shown disapproval of the Federal Communications
Commission several times. The Senate of the 80th Congress approved
the McFarland Bill which would have curtailed the influence of FCC
staff. A majority of the Commission favored a substitute bill introduced
in the House. The Senate committee subjected the next FCC nomina-
tion, that of Commissioner George E. Sterling to an extended grilling,
though the members did not object to him personally. At the end of
the hearing they unanimously confirmed him.30 Terming its career
varied and in some respects checkered, Senators dug deeply into Com-
mission policy and personal views of Commissioners. Nominees were
asked their views on amending the communications act, superpower
(when oral argument was pending before the Commission), indefinite
licenses, permanent or rotating chairmen, and other policies. On the
30 Note 21, supra. Also, Nomination of Wayne Coy and George E. Sterling to the
FFC, 80th Congress, 2d session, Jan. 20,1948, p. 22.
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reconfirmation of Commissioners Coy and Sterling, the committee's
central theme was that the FCC is an arm of Congress. Both Com-
missioners showed great administrative courtesy, and also contributed
suggestions for closer cooperation between the committee and the Com-
mission. However, explicit statements of committee views on details,
and requests for opinions on changes in the law when commissioner's
reappointments were at stake were untenable.
On the renomination of Leland Olds to the FPC for a third term
in 1949, The New York Times picked the crucial question: Do Mr.
Olds' present views and his record as a Commissioner for the last
decade warrant his reappointment?3' More concretely, another writer
cited the real issue as "the Kerr bill and federal regulation of the
price of gas." 32 Although a few Senators considered the issue, most
of the debates went wide of their mark, dwelling on more emotional
aspects of personal ideology at the time and years before.
For his second term in 1944 Olds was recommended, 3 to 2, by a
subcommittee. In 1949 the subcommittee heard 34 witnesses, took over
300 pages of testimony in three days, and heard Mr. Olds for six hours
(two in reply to testimony against him). In the words of Senator
Johnson, "a more searching ... hearing was never held by any com-
mittee in Congress." 33 A unanimous decision against him may indicate
decisiveness, or a prejudiced committee and steamroller methods. On
the other hand, the appearance of a man in "mental undress" under
cross examination is vital. Four of -the seven committee members were
Democrats. Three of the seven had supported him as members of the
1944 subcommittee, but in 1949 they voted against him. The full
committee voted 10 to 2 against confirmation; the adverse vote in-
cluded those of the majority of the Democratic members of the com-
mittee.
The charges against Mr. Olds were: that he had the zeal and fire
of a crusader, that he lacked judicious temperament, and that his back-
ground and record showed him more sympathetic to public than to
private power. More specifically, it was alleged he had administered
the agency's legal mandates at the expense of state regulatory com-
missions and had interpreted the Natural Gas Act contrary to con-
gressional intent. But is "congressional intent" determined from what
was said when the bill was under discussion in committee hearing, from
debate on the floor of the House or Senate when the law was enacted,
or by the committee 6urrently supervising 'the administrative agency?
Is it presumptuous for the Senate to interpret congressional intent
without consulting the House?
81 October 8, 1949.
32 J. p. Harris, "The Senatorial Rejection of Leland Olds: A Case Study" in The
American Political Science Review, Sept. 1951, p. 684.
33 Congressional Record, Vol. 95, Part 11, Oct. 12, 1949, p. 14357.
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Commissioner Olds obviously had alieniated support of many
Republicans, utility interests, and powerful gas-oil contingents in
the Southwest.34 But the record does not show whether Mr. Olds per-
verted the laws he was required to administer. Senators quoted, for
example, excerpts from Supreme Court decisions for and against his
interpretation of the laws. Some were decisions; some apparently dicta.
Actually, the relation of a commissioner's interpretation of the laws
and the court's is no criteria for evaluating the work of the man. Even
if courts reject his analysis of the law, members of a commission can
advise and even be energetic and vigorous in advocating changes in
the law. In many instances Congress could amend the law in support
of a commissioner's view rather than adhere to court interpretation.'
In this case, however, the committee questioned the willingness of
the nominee to carry out the purposes of Congress, as compared with
his own analysis of regulatory problems, public policies, and ideologies.
His conception of public welfare and consumer interests seemed almost
identical. Although extraneous matters undoubtedly were factors too,
the Senate concluded that his temperament and background were
not desirable in administering the act. Confirmation was refused,
53 to 15.
The next year Congress passed the Kerr Bill which amended the
Natural Gas Act contrary to the Olds' view. But President Truman
exercised his legislative function of vetoing the measure. That raised
the dilemma whether a commission should interpret a law which
needed clarification in accordance with legislative amendment or
executive veto.3 5 Subsequently the majority of the Commission in-
terpreted the act along the broad principles of the Kerr Bill, while
the minority adhered to the general analysis of the veto.30
The nomination of Thomas C. Buchanan to the Federal Power
Commission was held up for more than a year before confirmed, al-
though he held an interim appointment for nearly one year.3 7 Testi-
mony indicated unimpeachable character and adequate training and
experience, but conflicted on his open-mindedness and judicious tem-
perament. During his nine years on the Pennsylvania commision,
Buchanan concurred in every rejection of rate increases, but dissented
from every approval; in every case where the state commission ordered
34 For Mr. Olds' view of the proceedings, see his articles in the New York Post,
Oct. 26,27,28, 30, 1949.
35 Lincoln Smith, "Can Southwestern States Limit Gas Exportation?" in Public
Utilities Fortnightly, Aug. 17, 1950.
36 In the Matter of Phillips Petroleum Company, FPC Opinion No. 217, Aug. 22,
1951.
37 Congressional Record, Vol. 95, Part 6, June 6, 1949, pp. 7250-7254. Nomination
of Thomas C. Buchanan to the FPC. Hearings before subcommittee of the Com-




utilities to reduce their rates, he either voted with the majority or
dissented because the reductions were inadequate. His opponents at-
tributed to him pressure tactics and political activity as a minority
member of the Pennsylvania commission.
Senator Herbert R. O'Conor claimed the vital questions on the
confirmation of John Carson to the Federal Trade Commission were:
1. whether he is a loyal American citizen interested in maintaining
these American institutions which have been so effective in bringing
America to its present high estate, and 2. whether his economic stabil-
ity and experience in the field of trade and commerce were adequate.3 8
But other issues overshadowed these. Should the Commission be bi-
partisan, or recognize splinter parties? (Carson is an independent.)
Another question was whether this former "public relations" man for
the Cooperative League of the United States would, as Commissioner,
promote the cooperative movement. Others contended business had
four representatives on the Commission, and cooperatives were en-
titled to one. One witness likened the Commission to a carp pond.
"If carp are put in a pond and fed they become sluggish. In order to
stimulate them to swim around and get into good condition for eating,
a big tough wall-eyed pike is thrown in to bite theni. Mr. Carson
would be like a pike in a carp pond. I think we need more pike in some
of the carp ponds in Washington." Recommended in committee 8 to
4 on a partisan vote, Carson was approved, 45 to 25.
Mon C. Wallgren, former associate of Truman in the Senate and
ex-Governor of the State of Washington, was rejected by the Senate
as chairman of the National Security Resources Board, but five months
later was confirmed to the FPC.39 Maybe the Senate was capricious,
or considered Wallgren incompetent for one but desirable for the
other post, or perhaps it was unwilling to squelch the President as
well as a former colleague twice in a row.
After many years of service in the New York legislature, the
House of Representatives, and Senate, James MA. Mead's nomination
to the Federal Trade Commission met with overwhelming support. 40
Routine speeches stressed that the Senators knew him, thought well of
him, and that he would bring to the FTC not only an intelligent
understanding of its work, "but of its real purpose in being an arm
of the legislative body."
Subordinates are encouraged to offer suggestions, but when one
opposes or criticises the boss who is responsible for authority delegated
to an administrator, the alternatives are generally that the subordinate
must convince or dissociate himself from the organization. 41 If com-
38 Congressional Record, Vol. 95, Part 10, Sept. 16, 1946, pp. 12973-13011.
39 Ibid., Vol. 95, No. 196, Oct. 19, 1949, pp. 15319-15322.
40 Ibid., Vol. 95, Part 11, p. 14987.
41 Alvin Brown, Organization of Industry (New York, 1947), pp. 55-57.
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missioners openly criticise, even academically, the chief executive and
/or legislative branch, they do so at their own peril.42 This introduces
the case of Sumner T. Pike, the pioneer of a watchdog committee in
action.
A year before the expiration of his first term on the Atomic Energy
Commission, acting chairman Pike impaired his relations with the
Senate as guest speaker at Bowdoin College. After explaining that the
congressional committee had decided that it should not know the
production rates and stock-pile of atomic weapons, he continued:
One can easily put himself in the position of any individual
committeeman and can share his reluctance to be charged
with this knowledge. As one congressman not on the Com-
mittee recently said in a hearing, "Don't tell me any secrets.
Talk is a congressman's stock in trade and he is liable to use
anything he knows when he talks, which is most of the time."
This, of course, is an exaggeration but it highlights the prob-
lem of the congressman or anyone else who has to run for
office.
Whatever the wisdom of the move, it may well be that lack of
this knowledge has interfered with a really good sense of pro-
portion on the part of some members of the Committee and
has led to some feeling of frustration on its part in attempting
to appraise the results of the enterprise. The recent charges
against the Commission's Chairman, and the hearings which
have followed, based as they have been on comparatively
peripheral and insignificant items in the .program seem to
me to have had their source in a basic inability to make a
sound appraisal of the relative importance of the various
elements which constitute the Commission's work.
Commissioner Pike also indicated that the process of attrition
(outlined in Part I) might have begun in the field of atomic energy.
He cited legislation then under consideration 'to limit the Com-
mission in meeting unexpected and unforeseen situations. He also
stated that political considerations had been injected into congres-
sional consideration of some AEC problems.
Pike was renominated. After a short hearing which was con-
cerned with a vague charge of inefficiency and platitudes, the Senate
section of the committee voted 5 to 4 against confirmation. Four
of the five opposing Senators were Republicans, two were from
Colorado. Mr. Truman's request -that the committee reconsider went
unheeded. With the majority and minority factions of the committee
acting as prosecutor and defender, the nomination was finally con-
firmed, 56 to 24.
42 Two of the commissioners whose views were requested for this study felt
obliged to refrain from discussing the proper course of action to be taken by the
President of the United States and the Congress.
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Pike's record as a liberal Republican (Senator Taft once referred
to him as "just another New Dealer" and subsequently voted against
confirmation) alieniated many of his own party cohorts. Then again
he was referred -to not only as a Republican and too much of a Repub-
lican but also as a Maine Republican. Senator Hickenlooper did not
call him a Red, but he claimed there was "a reticence on the part
of Mr. Pike to clean out of the AEC those whose views are a little
pink."43
The opposition emphasized the need for bold and sensible ad-
ministrative judgment on a powerful commission with unique respons-
ibilities. Testimony also indicated that no advice from the joint
congressional committee was solicited or given by the President, and
occasional slaps were taken at the failure of the President and his
staff to consult the committee.
According to Senator Johnson of Colorado, Pike had once
questioned his own ability to sit on the Commission. At the time of
his original confirmation (several months after he began to serve) the
chairman of the Senate section of the committee asked Pike if he had
formed a substantial or basic conclusion as to the general field of
activity, present responsibilities, and future plans of the Commission.
In reply, Pike frankly and modestly made this proviso: "I want to
say, Mr. Chairman, in taking hold of the job, after two or three
months, you begin -to get some feel of it, some feel of the size of it, and
what you may be able to do with it. This is the only one I ever tackled
which seemed further out of reach now than it did the day I looked
at it."44 He continued that in the first few weeks the new commissioners
took a trip around the country, to get some idea of the magnitude of the
job ahead. They talked with 35 or 40 scientific specialists. "If there is
one thing that was left with me afterward it was that each one of them
seemed to feel more possibilities, probabilities, and almost certainties,
that required investigation; so many that all they .needed was more
men, more money, and more time. So it raised this whole series of
question marks, promising things that ought to be looked at."
Senator Tom Connally called the above a compliment to Pike,
claiming that if Pike had said: "Why, yes; I know all about atomic
energy," he would have suited his opponents admirably.45 Senator
Lucas doubted if any man in America could truthfully say he had all
the qualifications needed for the complicated problems of atomic
energy.46 But Yankee skepticism and frank approach provided op-
ponents a wide avenue of excuse for attack. They failed to perceive
43 Congressional Record, Vol. 96, No. 134, July 7, 1950, p. 9906.
44 Hearing before the Senate section of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy,
Jan. 28,1947, p. 47.
45 Congressional Record, Vol. 96, No. 134, July 7, 1950, p. 9906.
46 Ibid., p. 9915.
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that at first not many Senators knew much about their new jobs, or
that an able man, especially in a new and highly specialized activity,
will learn and grow on the job.
Senator Owen Brewster said that his investigation indicated a
seeming case of incompatability between Pike and some members of
the Senate committee. He stated his conviction that "at the bottom of
this whole controversy was that Mr. Pike is what we call up in Maine
a rather 'ornery cuss,' a fellow who speaks his mind rather plainly, as
perhaps many people in Maine and New England do, and sometimes
somewhat more generously than is entirely called for."47 Brewster
asked the Senators to make as large allowance as they could for this.
Both extremes-one who talks too bluntly and one who always weighs
every word-are unfortunate.
Pike first came to the attention of official Washington as a
Republican member of the Temporary National Economics Com-
mittee. President Roosevelt, according to Senator Paul H. Douglas, put
Pike on the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1940 because he
knew at first hand the intricacies of Wall Street-having participated
in some of them himself-and, while he was absolutely fair to the
corporations and the issuing houses, he stood like a rock in protecting
the public interest.48 In 1946 Pike resigned from the SEC; he said he
was getting stale on the job and wanted to go home to do some fishing.
But that summer President Truman called him back as an original
member of the AEC. He served more than five years. Late in 1951,
however, about 16 months after his reappointment, Pike resigned and
returned home -to fish. His only political ambition is to represent his
native Lubec in the legislature of Maine like his father did, 50 years
ago.49 He is financially self-sufficient, and his voluntary departures from
Washington show that he is not tied to any job that does not suit him.
Personality clashes and prejudices are present in confirmation
proceedings. David Lilienthal's refusal to make political appointments
at the TVA had repercussions in the Senate when he was on the AEC.
Senator Harry F. Byrd led the fight against confirmation of Martin A.
Hutchinson of Virginia to the FTC. Hutchinson, a Truman ally, had
opposed Byrd for the Democratic senatorial nomination in 1946.
Colorado's Senators were unhappy because Sumner Pike favored a
program of importing ores rather than developing low-grade Colorado
ores. One said he was willing to leave Pike's name on the peak in
Colorado, but not on the Commission. 50 A cynic might trace part of
47 Ibid., p. 9914.
48 Ibid., Part 7, pp. 9763-9764. Senator Douglas, classmate and fraternity brother
of Pike said: "In college, we all regarded Sumner Pike as the ablest man of our
college generation, having an amazing grasp of physics, chemistry, and mathematics
and a perceptive and sure common sense."
49 May Craig, in Portland Press Herald, Nov. 26, 1949.
50 Congressional Record, Vol. 96, No. 134, p. 9919.
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Senator Hickenlooper's opposition to Pike to the Iowa Senator's un-
successful opposition to Lilienthal, whom Pike had supported strongly.
Some Senators did not like Mr. Olds.51 But the reverse was true in the
confirmation of George E. Allen to the Reconstruction Finance Cor-
poration. Although lacking in outstanding qualifications and despite
protests in the press, the "public relations" man and "White House
jester" made such a good appearance at the hearing5 2 that he was
recommended and confirmed.5 3
V
If the executive controls the agencies, a drift toward unrestrained
bureaucracy would be precipitated. If the legislative branch dominates,
regimentation and rigidity would result. If either branch wins out,
the r6le of the courts will be increased and the concept of regulation
as an administrative function eliminated. As the pendulum swings
between legislature and executive, an equilibrium is created which,
though aggrevating at times, gives the commissions a varied degree of
independence and injects vitality into them.
Top staffing is a joint, not a divided, responsibility; it is a
complementary but not coextensive process in which the initiative and
major responsibility rests with the chief executive. It is a unique way
to diffuse economic and political values; a difference between the
administrative and executive functions; and the only ethical way in
which the executive can interfere with regulation. The chief executive
produces the candidates, under the statutes, at his own discretion. He
may use this power in the public interest or to build up his own
strength. His selections indicate a sense of direction, as differentiated
from the general purposes determined by Congress.
A strong leader has many devices to imprint his influence on com-
51 Said Senator Johnson: "Personally, I regard Leland Olds as a warped, tyranical,
mischievous, egotistical chameleon, whose predominant color is pink" (Debate on Olds
confirmation, p. 14359).
52 Senator Taft grilled Allen about his support for a Negro housing project in
Washington at the behest of the evangelist Elder Solomon Lightfoot Michaux,
espedally what he got out of it. In the words of Allen: "I replied truthfully and with
dignity that I had been made an honorary deacon in Elder Michaux's tabernacle....
I was reluctantly beginning to have a pretty good time, and members of the committee
seemed to be enjoying my cross examination, too. I testified that I didn't purpose to
resign my business connections because I wasn't sure Truman would be re-elected and
I wanted some place to go if the Republicans came to power and fired me, as of course
they would. It is odd that the simple, unadorned, and bluntly stated truth can be so
amusing. By now the committee was in stitches." George E. Allen, Presidents Who
Have Known Me (New York, 1950), pp. 205-206.
53 Congressional Record, Vol. 92, Part 1, 79th Congress, 2d session, Feb. 18, 1949,
p. 1413.
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missions. Interim appointments have been used effectively. The
entering wedge may become a fait accompli. The appointee has made
his contacts and created his own following. By the time of confirmation,
a rebuttable presumption and possessory obligation may have arisen
from having been on the job. Senatorial rejection then might disrupt
the commission as a "going concern."
The Senate's function in confirming is a negative one, like sifting
the nominees through either a net or sieve. The veto is absolute, but in
general can be used sparingly among honorable men. In this screening
process, some Senators have pried deeply into details of commission
policy, often implying their own preferences. One wonders how in-
dependent some commissions can be. Commissioners should give care-
ful consideration to views of Senators -wherever made, but Senators
should not expound or argue on details. The rule that commissioners
should administer the law as they find it, regardless of their ideological
objectives, applies with equal force to individual members of a
legislative body or committee.
The Senate has attempted to inject higher standards in administra-
tive personnel by establishing a code of ethics in professional conduct
over and above bare compliance with the law; but how much in-
dividual character can be regulated by law is questionable. 54 Character
should be evaluated before nomination and at confirmation hearings.
Institutional changes in the technique for the appointment of
commissioners can gain little. In some New England states appoint-
ment by the governor and executive council recognize to some degree
the parliamentary form of government. Although a hangover from
colonial time, the governor is checked not by the legislature or any
portion of it, but by a special council or committee of elder statesmen,
a legislative cabinet, which has roughly the confidence of the legislature.
This generally places the commissions within the executive hierarchy.
Actually, however, the system has sometimes carried incumbents over
in office for a long period, notwithstanding the unwillingness of the
governor to reappoint them, because a majority of the council favored
them and no other nominee therefore could secure confirmation.
Although quite a number of states elect regulatory commissioners,
the system lacks a logical basis. The electorates are already over-
burdened. They are incompetent to determine and judge the highly
skilled and technical qualifications for the various jobs. Commissioners
have no specific responsibility to legislature or executive. Furthermore,
administration needs to draw in talent which lacks personal qualifica-
54 It is based on the principle of an attorney asking a judge for an audience-in-
chambers which may be done before or while a case is in progress, but he cannot re-
quest advice while decision is pending. See note 12, supra. Here is Senator Aiken's
comment: "Laws alone will never improve the ethical and moral standards in the
Government; only a clear sense of honor and duty imposed on those who hold the
trust of public service can accomplish that end." p. 66.
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tions and money for success at the polls. If commissioners were put
under the classified system, that would fail to recognize the political
process, and tend to stagnate personnel. The method of appointing
commissioners was an issue in the Republican gubernatorial primaries
in New Hampshire in 1952. One unsuccessful contestant suggested
appointment by the state supreme court.
A discussion of trouble cases cannot present a full picture. The
fact that many able commissioners are chosen annually is a high
tribute to the regulatory process. An eminent authority on the Inter-
state Commerce Commission, for example, concluded that this body
was composed predominantly of commissioners who measured up in
highly creditable fashion to standards of fitness grounded in character,
training, and experience. 5 That trouble can and does arise shows that
the democratic process is in a vigorous state of good health. Com-
missioner Eastman documented this:
Sitting in dignity and looking down on suppliants from the
elevation of a judicial bench has its dangers. A reversal of the
position now and then is good for the soul. It has for many
years been my good fortune to appear rather frequently
before legislative or congressional committees. They are a
better safeguard against inflation than the 0. P. A.
When an administrator emerges victorious from a clash, he may
have profited by the ordeal and be a better person and administrator.
If a man becomes a candidate for any public office, he must voluntarily
forsake considerable privacy. On the other hand, the petulance and
flippancy in some cases have harrangued able men shamelessly and
needlessly. 6 A candidate must show proper respect for the Senate, yet
he is helpless if Senators do not reciprocate.
Recent confirmation hearings have not always grappled with
relevant matters. But the Senate must be applauded in instances where
it did not become involved emotionally and take sides until its
committee colleagues produced evidence. One may note with approval
the great weight the Senate has given to local sentiment. In several
cases the standing of the candidate in his own bailiwick won nods of
approval from Senators. This factor in appraising the capacities of
public servants at the grassroots is vital. The opinions of colleagues
are valuable, if not beset with professional rivalries and ideological
differences.
5 I. L. Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce Commission (New York, 1937). Vol. 4,
pp. 2243.
GG In support of Mr. Olds, Senator Aiken remarked: "I think probably his use-
fulness as a public servant is about done. He should be much happier in other work.
When an attack on the character of a man such as has been directed at him has been
indulged in, it just about destroys the usefulness of a public servant. It is things like
this that make it so hard to get good men and women into public life." p. 14372.
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Two constructive suggestions can be made in the process of
appointing commissioners. Prenomination consultation between the
President or his staff and Senate leaders and committee chairmen may
alleviate some cause of friction and also be more equitable to the
prospective appointee. Cooperation in a complementary process might
be more effectively achieved at the outset, before the coordinate
nature of the two branches becomes emphasized. At the hearings
committee chairmen could frequently keep questions more in bounds
than they sometimes have, because hearings offer too much temptation
for political tangents. That a surprisingly large number of Senators do
subordinate opportunities for personal publicity to the qualifications
of the nominee offers hope for an influx of able commissioners.
The situation in some states is catastrophic. On the national
scene one can be neither dogmatic nor complacent about a more
respectable record. If the commissions are to continue independent of,
and yet responsible to two, and in a sense three, branches of govern-
ment, the fluctuating conflicts must be resolved judiciously, with vigor
and yet self-restraint. Elect statesmen wise enough to make any system
work; exhort them to use discretion in their value judgments for
nominations and confirmations; and then caution the commissioners
to adhere tto legislative policy, executive principles, and judicial
standards. If a prescription of exhorting public officials seems in-
sufficient, one alternative is to establish direct responsibility for the
commissions in the legislative or executive branch. But that would
invite new and untried evils. The cure might be worse than the malady.
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